Predictive Critical Mineral Supply Chains

Final In-Class Presentation

At Stanford, six students with backgrounds spanning military intelligence, AI, materials science, and industrial engineering came together for one of the most urgent missions in national security innovation today: safeguarding the United States’ access to critical minerals.

Sponsored by In-Q-Tel and the Department of Commerce’s Industrial Base Policy team, their challenge wasn’t simply technical. It was geopolitical. As China consolidates control over 90% of the world’s critical mineral processing, the U.S. faces systemic risk: economic, military, and strategic. The question their Hacking for Defense (H4D) team confronted was this: How do you secure a supply chain the government doesn’t fully see?

They called themselves ChipForce. But by the end of the semester, they would become something else entirely: SupplyShield, an emerging digital platform to predict and defend against economic statecraft in strategic materials.

What Was at Stake

The U.S. government doesn’t lack interest in critical minerals. It lacks coordination. With more than 40 offices touching the problem, dozens of conflicting definitions of “critical,” and no centralized intelligence layer, adversaries like China have found opportunity in ambiguity.

ChipForce was tasked with mapping that chaos and proposing interventions bold enough to meet the moment.

Their initial brief focused on the upstream: mining access, tariffs, and domestic investment. But early interviews reframed the problem. “Processing is the chokepoint,” one investor said. Another, a former defense official, warned that “no one agrees what’s ‘critical’ until it’s too late.” The team quickly realized that the real vulnerability wasn’t extraction. It was manipulation: of prices, partnerships, export policies, and market perception.

And manipulation, they noted, is a problem of visibility.

Discovery & Fieldwork

By the end of their H4D course, ChipForce had conducted more than 230 interviews across national security, commercial industry, venture capital, and international allies. They briefed senior officials at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, presented strategic recommendations to the incoming DoD Critical Minerals Chief, and influenced active workstreams within the Department of Commerce’s Section 232 Investigation Team.

Their insights were informed by deeply embedded fieldwork, including:

• 5 National and International Conferences: From the IQT CEO Summit and National Security Salon to the ALTA Financial Review Mining Conference in Australia

• 38 In-Person Interviews in Australia: Exploring allied opportunities for U.S. strategic partnerships in mineral processing

• Direct Briefings to Senior Officials: Including 3 separate sessions with ODNI and follow-on engagement with the Principal Deputy Director

• Private Sector Investigations: Engaging with technology platforms, miners, and downstream manufacturers to understand vulnerabilities across the full stack

Every conversation added texture to a disturbing pattern: China was not only manipulating prices and controlling supply, but shaping the entire ruleset of global mineral policy. What the U.S. lacked wasn’t just capacity. It lacked intelligence.

Their Three-Part Policy and Infrastructure Package

While most student teams focus on MVP development, ChipForce approached the problem like a layered systems architect. Their final recommendations weren’t just technical — they were strategic, regulatory, and structural. Through more than 230 interviews and a deep analysis of federal fragmentation, they crafted a three-part package that now informs ongoing government conversations:

1. Policy Reform through Section 232 Tariffs and Targets: ChipForce proposed leveraging the existing Section 232 authority to rebalance the critical minerals market through phased domestic sourcing targets, for example, requiring 10 percent U.S. or allied-sourced critical minerals by 2026, scaling to 100 percent by 2030. Their recommendations, submitted directly to the Section 232 Investigation Team, advocated for tariffs that equalize price distortions caused by Chinese dumping and reward secure, traceable supply chains.

2. Centralized Authority: A White House-Level Critical Minerals Coordinator After mapping more than 40 fragmented offices involved in critical minerals policy, the team called for a centralized Critical Minerals Czar role housed within the Executive Office of the President. This official would be responsible for cross-agency alignment, strategy execution, and budget integration across the Departments of Defense, Energy, Commerce, and State. Their proposal resonated with sponsors at ODNI and the Department of Commerce, and elements of it are now being reviewed for escalation.

3. Strategic Refining Infrastructure via Innovation Fund Deployment: Recognizing that U.S. vulnerability stems more from processing than mining, ChipForce recommended the launch of a stage-gated refining innovation fund, in partnership with the Office of Strategic Capital. Their proposal included targeting former Superfund sites for domestic refining pilots, thereby aligning environmental rehabilitation with industrial base expansion. The fund would serve as both an R&D accelerator and a proof-of-concept validator for allied-sourced refining capabilities.

Together, these proposals represented a comprehensive infrastructure package that fused policy, operational authority, and public-private innovation. By articulating both urgency and feasibility, ChipForce moved beyond discovery to design actionable scaffolding for real-world national security transformation.

From Policy to Platform

Most H4D teams end the semester with recommendations. ChipForce ended theirs with a prototype and a clear next phase.

In collaboration with DIU, the team transitioned into a Defense Innovation Unit fellowship to build SupplyShield, a digital twin for critical mineral supply chains. The platform uses network analytics and supplier mapping to reveal dependency blind spots, anticipate price shocks, and empower both government and industry to act before the crisis hits.

In the commercial sector, SupplyShield helps companies meet compliance standards, stabilize procurement, and guard against cascading price volatility. For government users, the system creates mission-relevant risk assessments and supports more intelligent stockpiling and industrial base policy.

They didn’t just frame the problem. They’re building the tool to solve it.

Operators of Another Kind

• Emmanuelle “Emma” Williamson – Computer Science and Tech Policy, Stanford. Team lead and technical architect behind SupplyShield 

• Mateo Petel – Mathematics, AI, Remote Sensing. Led analytics modeling and international research 

• Sid Gopisetty – Electrical Engineering (BS), Materials Science (MS). Designed the systems diagram and supplier dependency logic 

• Abby Reinhold – MBA, Trade Policy. Directed policy mapping and U.S.–Australia alliance strategy 

• Alexis Opferman – Former Naval Intelligence Officer. Coordinated national security stakeholder engagement and DoD briefings 

• Harry Kaplan – Industrial Engineering. Structured business model canvas and scale-up roadmap for platform continuation

Together, this team brought more than 21 years of combined experience in military service, science policy, venture, and engineering. What united them? A shared belief that supply chain resilience isn’t just a logistics challenge. It’s a form of deterrence.

Mission Forward

SupplyShield is now on track to continue development through DIU’s emerging tech initiatives and federal research partners. Their work has influenced a forthcoming Gordian Knot Center report and created lasting partnerships between Stanford, DoC, and U.S. allies in Australia.

Their goal is simple: give the U.S. strategic leverage where it currently has none. Through real-time visibility, predictive analytics, and digital policy war-gaming, they are helping reshape the future of critical mineral security.

And it all started in a classroom.